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The Judicial Reform in China: The Status
Quo and Future Directions
JI WEIDONG*
ABSTRACT
This article shows that Chinese adjudication is in a dilemma: on one
hand, the judicial discretion is extensive; on the other hand, public
opinion supervision is adopted to control the discretion. In fact, the
public opinion and judicial discretion could co-exist and compliment one
another. There is no objective and stable framework regulating both.
There are attempts aiming to completely negate the judicial discretion,
such as computer sentencing. A strange logic of judicial reform exists in
China: either eliminating the judicial discretion through such
mechanical methods as computer sentencing in the hope to guarantee
judgment in conformity with the law; or resorting to the arbitrary
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external power intervention or public opinion supervision to constrain
the judicial discretion, resulting in a new form of discretion.
In the author's opinion, the critical nexus of institutional designing
of good governance is an independent judiciary following the principle of
procedural fairness. Therefore it is necessary for China to first establish
the courts' authority through judicial reforms, laying the institutional
foundation of rule-of-law. Then comes the supervising and checking of
the legality of the government power. More importantly, an independent
judiciary functions as a neutral arbiter of conflicting interest groups and
a third-party enforcer of contracts, which enhances the predictability of
market transactions and safeguards fair competition.
Compared with structural shift of political power, judicial reform is
relatively less difficult and more practical. If judicial reform dooms to
fail, how is it possible for a comprehensive political reform to succeed? It
is admitted that the judicial reform is subject to the overall power
arrangements, nevertheless, it is still probable that we resort to judicial
reform, as a breakthrough or reference, a gradual switch on the
transformation of political power structure, centering on fundamental
requirements of rule-of-law. This roadmap, of course, has preconditions,
that is, that the ruler has adequate practical rationality and that society
reaches consensus on rule-of-law.
INTRODUCTION
China has experienced a fundamental change in its mode of
economic management since its reforming and opening up to the outside
world: from the ex ante administrative permit and direct regulation to
the ex post judicial remedy and indirect restraint. According to a
Chinese economist, it is characterized with "progressive interference of
the judiciary in the market control."1 The proper role of the judiciary in
the market economy depends on its strict impartiality and final ruling,
which call for a higher degree of judicial independence and a higher
level of judicial technique. However, in light of the existing institutions
and their practices, China's judicial power is unique because the
principle of judicial independence is not established in its operation.
1. See ZHOU QIREN, PROPERTY RIGHT AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: STUDY ON THE
EXPERIENCE OF CHINA'S REFORM 262 (2004).
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I. CHARACTERISTICS AND PROBLEMS OF THE EXISTING JUDICIAL SYSTEM
A. Power Structure and Functional Relationship
In accordance with the provisions of China's Constitution and the
Statute of the Judiciary, the Supreme People's Court is the highest
judicial organ in the country.2 As a result, it is the last resort for all
kinds of litigation activities, and there is not much room for further
questioning after the Supreme Court has made its decision. However, as
the national judicial supervision body, the Supreme People's
Procuratorate 3 has the imprescriptible power to challenge the judicial
decisions of the People's Supreme Court, which can result in a de novo
trial against the final judgment. 4 In this sense, the power of Chinese
procurators is reminiscent of the former Soviet Union's legal system, in
which the Procuratorate was dominant over the judiciary. 5 For this
reason, supremacy of the judicial power is not fully established in the
functioning of the Chinese legal system.
In addition, when dealing with criminal cases, the principles of duty
division and checks and balances are shared among the public security
authorities, procuratorates, and people's courts. It seems that there is
no difference in significance and supremacy among such three powers6
(or four powers if the departments of justice-national and local-are
included). What's more, the public security organizations, namely the
police, as a practical matter, can exert influence within the legal system,
which contributes to the dominance and supremacy of the police as a
branch of the executive in criminal investigations and social security.
For example, the secretary of the Politics and Law Committee for the
local branches of the Communist Party of China (CPC) often acts as the
chief of the police. The basic principle that guarantees judicial justice in
China is the functioning of the system in which the police and
2. CONST. Art. 129 (China); Art. 18, China's Statute of the Judiciary.
3. The Supreme People's Procuratorate is the highest agency at the national level and
is responsible for both prosecution and investigation in the People's Republic of China.
The office of the Procurator is influenced by similar institutions (public procurator) in both
Japan and Socialist legal systems, and finds equivalence in most civil law systems, which
often use an inquisitorial system.
4. See Constitution art. 129 (2004) (China); Organic Law of the People's
Procuratorates of the People's Republic of China art. 18 (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979), http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/
207241.htm.
5. See generally KENZO TAKAYANAGI, THE SUPREMACY OF THE JUDICIAL POWER:
THEORY AND PRACTICE [SHIHOKEN NO YUI: RIRON TO JISSAI] (1958) (discussing the
supremacy of judicial power in modern rule of law) (Japan).
6. XIANFA art. 135 (2004) (China).
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procuratorial authorities work together in the supervision of judicial
activities.
B. Denotation of the Judicial Independence in China
The delineation of judicial independence in China's Constitution is
limited to judicial decisions and is not subject to the interference of
administrative agencies, 7 social organizations, or individuals. It does not
impose that same restraint on the lawmaking agencies; on the contrary,
the courts are responsible8 to lawmaking authorities. The institutional
law of local congresses provides that all levels of congresses and their
standing committees, along with the people's representatives, have the
power to supervise the activities of corresponding courts, as well as
relevant complaints9 and suggestions. The Supreme People's Court has
made a judicial interpretation, which requires that all levels of courts
actively accept the supervision of the People's Congress. This has paved
the way for the People's Congresses to interfere with the activities of the
judiciary and also to "supervise"'0 individual judicial cases beyond what
has been permitted by law."
7. XIANFA art. 126 (2004) (China).
8. See XIANFA art. 128 (2004) (China).
9. Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 4, 1979, effective Jan. 1,
1980) art. 44 http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/olotlpcalpgotproc98/ (China)
(stating the supervisory function of a local people's congress, but does not state that the
congress may correct a specific ruling as is currently done in practice). See also Jiang
Huiling (44ii), Lun Guojia Quanli Jiguan dui Fayuan de Jiandu
( [On the Supervision of the Congress on the Judiciary],
RENMIN SIFA (.KR1) [PEOPLE'S JUSTICE], no. 5, 1995; CAi DINGJIAN (Ati1),
ZHONGGUO RENDA ZHIDU (0fAR7T,-'*JA) [THE CHINESE SYSTEM OF PEOPLE'S
CONGRESSES] 373 (1996).
10. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Jieshou Renmin Daibiao
Dahui jiqi Changwu Weiyuan Hui Jiandu de Ruogan Yijian
(f1FiAR f9;0 -TA'RONVM [Several
Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Accepting the Supervision by the People's
Congress and its Standing Committee] (1998)
http://www.lawtime.cn/info/sifakaoshi/sikaofagui/2011101463 127.html (China).
11. There are considerable debates in legal academia regarding individual supervision.
See generally Wang Chenguang (!MER), Lun Fayuan Yifa Duli Shenpan Quan he Renda
dui Fayuan Ge'an Jiandu Quan de Chongtu jiqi Tiaozheng Jizhi
( [On the Conflicts
between the Court's Independent Ruling in Law and the Supervision by Congresses in
Individual Case as Well as its Coordination Mechanism], in FALU KEXUE (AM4-) [LAW
SCIENCE] (1999) (China); Wang Fan (T-R), Qianyi Difang Renda de Ge'an Jiandu
( [On Local Congresses Supervising Individual Cases], in XIANDAI
FAXUE (t lf1-*) [MODERN LAw SCIENCE] 97, 97-99 (1998) (China); Xie Pengcheng
(o4m), Renda de Ge'an Jiandu Quan Gai Ruhe Dingwei (A(kV-0f-*1ffTVUMf]qZN)
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The Institutional Law of the Judiciary formulates the supervision 12
of a higher court over the activities of lower courts in the judicial
hierarchy. It is self-evident that the Supreme People's Court has the
power to supervise the ruling activities of all levels of local courts and
specialty courts. 13 Internally, judges have no independence in ruling on
individual cases, which leads to an intractable dilemma: without the
solidarity of the judicial system and because of the supervision of the
Supreme People's Court by outside bodies, the judicial body finds it hard
to resist external interference by legislative bodies. Under certain
circumstances, such mechanisms of supervision can turn out to be an
administrative means by which the judicial mechanism internally
inhibits the initiative and independence of judges.
C. Disadvantages of the Personnel and Financial Regulation of Chinese
Courts
It must be mentioned that personnel and funding depend on the
support of the corresponding local congress, administrative authorities,
and even the committee of the local CPC,14 which is associated with the
[How to Position the Supervision Powers of Congress in Individual Cases], FA XUE ()
[LAw SCIENCE], no. 9, 1999 (China); Gao Di (AN), Renda Zenme Jiandu Sifa
(-(AA-'#]A-]W7 -) [How Do the People's Congresses Supervise the Judiciary], FAZHI RIBAO
(N J A) [LEGAL DAILY], Oct. 20, 1999 (China).
12. Art. 30 (2), China's Statute of the Judiciary.
13. See Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, 7
J. CHINESE L. 145, 163 (1993) (This is exemplified by the 1982 Constitution stating that
the Court "supervises the administration of justice [adjudication work] of the people's
courts at various local levels and by the special people's courts.").
14. To put it exactly, it shall be expressed as "duality of leadership based on the local
authorities." Since the end of 1988, the Supreme People's Court has tried to promote the
pilot reform with a view of strengthening the competence of the higher court, but the basic
pattern hasn't changed yet. See Jiang Huiling ( Sifa Quan Difang Hua zhi Libi yu
Gaige ( [The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Localization
of Judicial Powers and its Reform], in RENMIN SIFA (kR A il) [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], no.
2, 1998 (China); Guo JISHENG (%2ft), FAYUAN GUANLI GAILUN ( t )
[INTRODUCTION TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COURTS] 154-55, 217 (1992) (China); WANG
LIMING (T _lj HJI), SIFA GAIGE YANJIU (Hi [RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL REFORM] 169
(2001) (China); Wang Xu (_=E)LH), Lun Sifa Quan de Zhongyang Hua (i"IM ,F 5) [On
the Centralization of Judicial Power], ZHANLUE Yu GUANLI (RM-jw ) [STRATEGY &
MGMT.], no. 5, 2001 (China). Although the expedient measure of retaining some litigation
fees for the courts to alleviate the funding difficulty of local government results in many
negative influences, it changes the original funding institution of the judicial body. This
change improves the independence of the judicial mechanism and its internal solidarity.
See Shen Deyong (itl), Ying Jianli yu Shichang Jingji Xiang Shiying de Fayuan Tizhi
(, [A Judicial System Adapted to the Market Economy
Shall be Founded], RENMIN RIBAO (A.R H49) [PEOPLE'S DAILY], June 6, 1994 (China);
Renmin Fayuan Susong Fei Guanli Banfa (A [Administrative
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institutional arrangement for the courts' responsibility to their local
People's Congress and their standing committees. In light of the
provisions of China's Constitution, relevant institutional law for the
judiciary, and local practice, all levels of local People's Courts and
Procuratorates are founded by the corresponding local Congress, and
the appointment and dismissal of judges and procurators is subject to
the decision of the corresponding level of congress. The local
administrative and CPC authorities are in charge of the management of
the judges and procurators, and the financial' budget of the courts and
procuratorates is under the control and management of administrative
bodies, such as local governments. 15
As a result, the Supreme People's Court cannot influence the lower
courts and their judges by means of judicial administration like budget
allocation and personnel promotion. Furthermore, its powers of
supervision on all levels of local and functional courts 16 is inevitably
Measures for the Litigation Fees of People's Courts] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct.,
Dec. 26, 2003, effective Jan. 1, 2004) (China), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com
display.aspx?lib=law&id=9366; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan (Renmin Fayuan Susong Shoufei
Banfa)) Buchong Guiding (9AA M (')) 7AL,) [Supreme
People's Court Supplemental Rules for the Measures on the Collection of Litigation Fees]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., July 28, 1999, effective July 28, 1999) (China),
available at
http://www.hainu.edu.cn/zyjingpinkecheng/asp-hainu-show.asp?id=3208&fuji-bbsid=546
; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jizhong Bufen Susong Feiyong Juti Jiejiao Shixiang de
Tongzhi ( /)jA1) [Supreme People's Court
Notification on Turning over Certain Part of Litigation Fee] (promulgated by the Sup.
People's Ct., Sep. 6, 1996, effective Sep. 6, 1996) Fa No. 87 (China), for references on
relevant problems and their corresponding reform.
15. See XIANFA art. 3, § 3 (1982) (China); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin
Fayuan Zuzhi Fa ( [Organic Law of the People's Courts of
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Chairman of the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., July 5, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980), arts. 22-4, 35, 1980 STANDING
COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz., available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2006-
12/05/content_5354938.htm) (China), for further discussion. In practice, in line with the
principle of CPC assuming the responsibility for cadres' affairs, the members of all levels
of the local judicial body shall consult with the corresponding CPC committee or be
approved after the appraisal of the organizing department of the CPC committee. The
members will then submit it to corresponding People's Congress or its standing committee
for appointment. See TAN SHIGUI (i5f), SIFA DULI WENTI YANJIU (
[STUDY ON THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE] 16, 16 (2004).
16. See JIRO NOMURA, SAIKO SAIBANSHO: SHIBO CHUSU NO UCHIGAWA, THE SUPREME
COURT OF JAPAN: THE INNER SIDE OF JUDICIAL LEADING CENTRE (1987) (Japan); Wang
Zhenlin 0" ), Faguan de 'Dingtou Shangsi'L-Riben Zuigao Fayuan Shiwu Zongju
Yanjiu (5 ''kE "-[ *,.J I ) [The "Immediate Superior" of
Judges: Study on the General Bureau for Judicial Administration of Japanese Supreme
Court], in ZUIGAo FAYUAN YANJIU (6951 REP) [STUDY ON THE SUPREME COURT] 195,
195 (Zuo Weimin (82R) ed. 2004) (China); for information on the centralization and
unity of the Japanese judicial system guaranteed by the personnel and financial
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restricted to a great extent. Since all levels of courts operate as those
living on a mountain live off the mountain and those living near the
water live off the water, a single judge or collegiate bench is not likely to
act impartially in trans-county or trans-province cases concerned with
interests of local political and economic stakeholders. Therefore, the
corrupt practices of local judicial protectionism continue in spite of
repeated prohibition and in fact tend to be more prevalent; recently, a
sensational ridicule has spread around that "there is no nationwide
court other than the Supreme People's Court."17 In attempting to protect
its independence, the question of how to avoid the decline of the
Supreme People's Court and maintain judicial unity has become a hard
nut to crack for judicial reform.
D. Unique Institutional Design and Its Paradox
Thus, it can be seen that the internal checks and balances within
the legal system-without the external checks and balances between the
legislature, the judiciary, and the administrative branch-allow for the
triad mechanism within the judicial system made up of the police
authorities, the procuratorate, and the court. This pattern of checks and
balances makes the courts act according to principles of locality, because
without a judicial system based on federalism, internal vertical
supervision is much more lax. These characteristics indicate the
uniqueness of the institutional design of China's judicial system.
Under the forgoing conditions, the paradoxical methodology and role
of the Supreme People's Court is demonstrated. For instance, the
principle of supremacy of the People's Congress calls for a passive
judicial system, which should apply the law to the letter. At the same
time, vertical supervision within the judicial system and elimination of
localized orientation demand some judicial activism. In cases of
overwhelming external pressure, the judiciary should act as a whole to
fight against interferences because it is difficult for the Supreme
People's Court to increase its role in the judicial system by means of
arrangements of the General Bureau for Judicial Administration of its Supreme Court.
See Akira Mikatsuki, Focus for the debates among the Supreme Court of Japan, 4 STUDY
ON THE CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAw (1967) (Japan); Institutional Reform of the Supreme Court
of Japan, 72 LEGAL PRAC. (1954) (Japan); Hideo Wada, KENPO TO SAIKO SAIBANSHO,
PRELIMINARY STUDY ON THE SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN (1971) (Japan) for information on
criticism and reform proposals.
17. See Liu Shuang (AIJA), 2004 Sifa Gaige Qianzhan Rang Sifa Jiguan Buzai Zhizao
Minyuan (2004 $ SL - [Prediction of the Judicial Reform
in 2004: Let the Judiciary No Longer be A Maker of People's Complaints], FALU YU
SHENGHUO (104_i' ) [LAw & LIFE], no. 1, 2004 (China).
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making personnel and financial arrangements. As a result, the Supreme
People's Court has to resort to other means to develop and consolidate
the organic link between all levels of courts. Nevertheless, such efforts
often result in internal inhibition and interference by higher courts,
which is detrimental to the maintenance of constant continuity of
judicial independence in its macro-dimension as well as in its
micro-dimension.
II. RECENT EXAMPLES OF INTERFERENCE IN ECONOMIC CASES BY THE
LOCAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
There are numerous cases in which the local party and
administrative authority have interfered arbitrarily. Below, case studies
of two typical economic cases concerning a far-reaching institution are
discussed.
A. Interference in a Mineral Rights Case by the Bureau of Land and
Resources of Shanxi Province
In the city of Yulin, Shanxi Province, a dispute arose concerning
mineral rights. The Intermediate People's Court of Yulin made its
decision of first instance in 2005, and the Supreme People's Court of
Shanxi Province upheld the original verdict on appeal in 2007. In
accordance with the rules of law concerned, this case has been
concluded and its ruling is effective and binding, but the judgment
cannot be enforced for several years. In March 2010, the Department of
Land and Resources of Shanxi Province convened a coordinating
conference, in which an administrative decision reversed the effective
judicial judgment, and the decision touched off a fight with weapons
between the contesting parties on July 17, 2010.
There was another similar case on mineral rights in Shanxi
province in 2006. On October 19, 2006, the Higher People's Court of
Shanxi Province delivered its judgment of first instance and the
judgment was later appealed to the Supreme People's Court. During the
second instance, the Shanxi Provincial General Office of Government
issued an official report of the case to the Supreme People's Court of
Shanxi Province, which was drafted by the Shanxin Provincial
Department of Land and Resources. The Shanxin Provincial
Department of Land and Resources politicalized the civil case, and
suggested that the Supreme People's Court should not uphold and
enforce the judgment of the first instance. The report even warned the
Supreme People's Court that upholding the first trial would bring about
serious repercussions and negative influences on the stability and
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development of Shanxi Province. On November 4, 2009, the Supreme
People's Court remanded the decision of the first instance back for a
new trial. On March 30, 2011, the Higher People's Court of Shanxi
Province delivered its decision in the retrial, during which the original
winning party became the losing party. On August 19, 2011, the police
of Yulin City arrested the disputing corporate representative and
charged him with "the crime of falsely reporting registered corporation
capital" due to his persistent visit-and-petition concerning the case. 18
B. The Xiamen CPC Committee's Interference in a Real Estate Case
On the morning of July 6, 2010, the deputy secretary of the CPC
Committee of Xiamen and its Secretary of the Politics and Law
Committee presided over a coordinating meeting for the real estate
dispute regarding the Jialiang Building. Later, a document listed as
No.18 (2010) was formulated for the Thematic Meeting Summary,
whose conclusion expressly states that it would "consult and request the
Provincial Supreme People's Court to agree [to] the suspension of the
enforcement of the effective judgment." As for the related reexamination
and retrial of the civil and administrative cases, the meeting even
temporarily set up an "integrated mechanism," which is sponsored and
supervised by the city CPC Committee and concerned departments of
the municipal government, wherein the Municipal Intermediate
People's Court and the Housing Management Bureau are responsible
for the specific implementation of the arrangements for the meeting.19
18. See Wang Guoqiang (:l=34), Gonghan Fazhi Zuigao Fa Shui Zai Ganyu Sifa
( t it - WJ ) [An Official Letter to the Supreme People's Court: Who Is
Interfering with Judicial Decisions], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO (q**) [CHINA
YOUTH DAILY], Aug. 2, 2010, available at http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2010-
08/02/content_3353561 .htm (China); Cui Muyang ( * ), Shanxi Kuangquan Jiufen
Fushang Bei Daibu ( [Rich Businessman Arrested for Mineral
Rights Dispute in Shanxi Province], XIN JING BAO (R3&) THE BEIJING NEWS, Aug. 31,
2011, at A23, available at http://epaper.bjnews.com.cnhtml/2011-
08/31/content_270181.htm?div---1 (China).
19. See Shiwei Huiyi Jiyao "Shangqing" Shengxiao Panjue Zanhuan Zhixing
(fdf: -i)Z: ,i J.W [The Meeting Summary of the City CPC Committee to
"Consult and Request for" Suspension of the Enforcement of an Effective Judgment],
ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO (+[RWIf-49) [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], Sept. 19, 2011, at 7,
available at http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2Oll-09/19/nbs.DllOOOOzgqnbO7.htm (China).
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C. The Institutional Channel for the Local Party and Government
Organs to Interfere in Judicial Appraisal
In the field of judicial appraisal, which is closely related to the
ruling of economic cases, many provinces including Shanxi, Qinghai,
Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Anhui, and Jilin, have established a
reporting institution for "major events" in judicial appraisal following
the application of The Decision on the Management of Judicial
Appraisal of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
on October 1, 2005. The so-called "major events" include "the appraisal
cases involved in immigration, land expropriation, house demolition
[and] relocation, enterprise bankruptcy and fund raising which will
probably end in collective visits-and-petitions." Much attention should
be paid to a general provision in such a reporting institution, which
demands "upon the reporting of major events, relevant judicial
administrative organs shall deal with them timely in accordance with
their competence as well as the nature, significance and urgency degree
of the events: for those matters under the competence of higher
authorities, they should report to the superior and ask for instructions;
the matters for the discipline, supervision and complaint organs shall be
transferred to them; in the case of major events which may jeopardize
social stability, the events shall be reported to the local CPC committee
or governments." Obviously, this institution for reporting "major events"
in judicial appraisal has become a channel for the CPC and government
organs to intervene in the evidence stage of trial, which is bound to
directly influence the admissibility of evidence and eventually the ruling
of the courts.
Under the foregoing background, there have sprung up many cases
of corruption and scandals involving various legal practitioners or
officials since 2000, such as the Huang Yousong Case, the Guo Jingyi
Case, and the 'Murder and Body-Dismembering Case of the Judge in
Zhejiang Provincial Higher People's Court." Furthermore, the Liu Yong
Case, the Xu Ting Case, the Peng Yu Case, and the 'Temporary Raping'
Case" have become national public events and indicate that the
professional integrity and skills of judges do not qualify them to adapt
to social requirements. Related to this, efforts to dispel social discontent
have failed to meet the expectations of the respective parties. Thus, the
degree of trust that the masses have for the administration of justice is
at its lowest point in history.20 Consequently, some pessimistic points of
20. Wu Jing (U), Zhuiqiu Kandejian de Gongzheng (.0*#g[q.hVY1 ) [Pursue
Visible Justice], RENMIN RIBAO (,.,R[R) [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Aug. 19, 2009, at 18,
available at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2009-08/19/content_322925.htm
(China).
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view have spread among legal circles, so that the conclusion is that
"China's rule of law is faced with retrogression" and "the prospect of the
legal professionals is gloomy."21
III. POLITICAL RESTRAINTS, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS
A. The Proportional Relationship between Judicial Review and Judicial
Independence
It is well-known that there are not checks and balances between the
legislature, the judiciary, and the administrative branch in China, and
all levels of courts are responsible to their corresponding People's
Congress and subject to its supervision. The People's Congress, along
with its standing committee, regularly appoint and dismiss judges. In
addition, the president of the court shall regularly report to the
Congress and accept its questioning. Although the Supreme People's
Court can sometimes make law by means of judicial interpretation, the
courts share no powers of judicial review of the law or local regulations;
rather, the courts have to adhere to the principle of legislative
supremacy, whether in theory or in institutional design. Therefore, the
express provisions are formulated so that the court cannot exercise
judicial review over administrative law and or abstract administrative
behavior utilized in making regulations or decisions. Although the
Supreme People's Court can deliver its interpretation of legal norms,
such interpretation is confined to the sphere concerned with judicial
ruling, and there is no reason to state an interpretation of the
Constitution. One can infer that the crux of improving judicial
independence is to expand the sphere of judicial review to embrace the
abstract administrative behavior, and in this way the legality of
administrative regulations and directives can be tested by judicial
review. Furthermore, the law and the activities of the Congress should
be subject to constitutional review.22
21. See Jiang Ping (Iz), Professor, China Univ. Political Sci. Law, Zhongguo de Fazhi
Chuzai Yige Da Daotui de Shiqi ( [China's Rule of Law in
a Time of Historic Retrogression], Address at the Lawyer Digest Annual Conference (Jan.
23, 2010) (available at
http://www.360doc.com/content/1O/O319/22/380096_19456476.shtml) (China).
22. See generally Ji Weidong (-]1Ii-), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan de Juese jiqi Yanhua
(XR0,WeA/ R_4N0 [The Role of the Supreme People's Court and its Evolution],
QINGHUA FAXUE (4*1-*) [TSINGHUA L. REV.], no. 1, 2006 (China).
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B. The Judicial Review is Now Limited to Specific Administrative
Activity
Existing judicial review in China is derived from Article 5 of the
1989 Administrative Procedural Law. Significantly, judicial review is
confined to specific acts of administration. Article 11 of the law
enumerates all kinds of specific acts of administration as the objects of
administrative litigation; at the same time, Article 12 (2) excludes
administrative regulations, directives, decisions, and orders with
general binding effect from the sphere of judicial review. Interpretation
by administrative agencies of administrative regulations, directives,
decisions, and orders, which generally has binding effect, is not a
specific act of administration, whereas all abstract administration acts,
to some extent, share the attribute of administrative interpretation of
the content of relevant rules by means of application. Logically,
therefore, the courts cannot rule on the legality of such interpretation.
Moreover, from the very beginning, Article 1 of the Administrative
Procedural Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC) provides that,
in addition to supervision, the purpose of administrative litigation is to
uphold the functionality of the administrative branch, with the latter
purpose ranking higher than the former purpose. Obviously,
administrative interpretations enjoy supremacy over judicial
interpretation in China, and such an arrangement of power works
against the modern principle of rule of law, which inevitably leads to
rule conflicts and disharmony within the legal system.
In recent years, it is encouraging to see that the legislature has
pursued an amendment of the Administrative Procedural Law of the
PRC in the right direction. A newly added draft article is of vital
significance, incorporating the human rights amendment to the
Constitution in 2004. The draft article specifies that citizens are entitled
to challenge the constitutionality of an abstract act of administration
(administrative rules) and are entitled to file an administrative lawsuit
for compensation. If enacted, this change will likely result in a broad
expansion in categories of administrative lawsuits. It would also give all
levels of courts the power to review and correct the legality and
constitutionality of local regulations, as well as other general decisions
and orders, which would in turn impose state compensation liability on
the executive authorities concerned. Such audacious reform, however,
has been delayed and there is no possibility of application in the near
future.
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C. Lack of Impetus for Judicial Review
The restraint of political reality also impedes legal professionals,
especially in the positive role of lawyers. In the community of legal
professionals, including judges, procurators, and lawyers, the lawyer is
much more closely linked to individual citizens, the market, and the
society. Whether in the harmonious development of the economy, the
protection of the interests of individuals, or the coordination of the order
of different norms, the lawyer plays an important mediating and
ordering role. However, China's structure of legal professionals is
unique when compared to the structure of legal professionals in other
countries. In a professional structure that is made up of judges,
procurators, and lawyers, lawyers make up just 20 percent of the total
professional structure. In 2000, the judge-to-lawyer ratio was 2.5:1,
which varies significantly from the ratios in other countries (1:3 in
South Korea, 1:3 in France, 1:6 in Japan, and 1:25 in the United
States). 23 The huge disparity in strength between judicial bureaucrats
and civilian lawyers has reversed the intended relationship between
authorities and the people for twenty years, causing some
disadvantages for legal discourse. The top-down order, publicity,
inculcation, and persuasion overwhelm bottom-up claims for rights and
easily distorts the feedback mechanisms of social control and regulation.
IV. MACRO-ANALYSIS: THE ROADMAP OF JUDICIAL REFORM FOR THE PAST
FIFTEEN YEARS
A. Prioritization of Fact Ascertainment over Effects of Norms
Before exploring approaches to judicial reform, it should be noted
that China's judicial system is centered on an axis of ascertainment of
facts and distinction of responsibility. Although the basic principle of
the judiciary is to "take facts as the basis and the law as the criterion,"
the objective facts (including those resembling verism) play a decisive
role in judicial practice. In the author's survey of the judicial system and
analysis of case records, most judges will conclude proceedings once the
whole truth has come to light, but deliberation and application of rules
is not important for the ruling. These principles imply that fact
ascertainment takes precedence over legal interpretation, and the
attribution of liability takes precedence over the definition of rights.
The nature of court debate can be summarized in a simple formula:
"to present facts and reason things out." Philosophy of law, here, is just
23. WANG LIMING, supra note 14, at 179-81.
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one of the arguments (in addition to reasonableness). A great deal of
procedural cost goes toward the court's fact-finding activities, such as ex
officio investigation, evidence taking, and the re-examination of
misjudged cases. Only judges know the comprehensive and detailed
facts of the case and so only after the court is confident in the knowledge
of the truth can the court session be opened. The advantage of such
institutional design is the asymmetry of information, in which the court
has the dominance over information. However, most facts of the case are
secret and only the clients know the real truth. Therefore, the court's
informational dominance is relative, whereas the clients' is absolute,
justifying the Chinese judicial tradition of emphasis on the confession of
the clients.
In the perspective of justice, one of the major reasons for facts and
liability to be on the axis of the administration of justice is so-called
"verism." Unlike the adversarial system, versim is more than fact
ascertainment by means of competitive persuasion; it puts much more
emphasis on truth seeking as a legal obligation and even absolutizes it.
In China's criminal litigations, the facts are not only the facts in legal
constitution, but are also objective truth. Therefore, the clients cannot
present facts that they consider untrue, and they cannot negate the
facts of the contesting party that they consider true. Even if the facts
are disadvantageous to their own claims, lawyers have the obligation to
present or discover all relevant facts or they will be punished under the
policy of: "leniency to confessors, severity to resisters." Correspondingly,
the fact that clients have protection in the right to silence and in the
lawyers' professional ethics, which require lawyers to be faithful to their
clients, may be ignored for a long time. Res judicata turns out to be
relative as a result of the principle of "rectifying whatever is wrong." In
civil litigation, verism, as the principle of good faith, is followed and
applied. The most typical expression of the court may include
conducting an investigation and obtaining evidence without any
restriction of the contents. Their scope of evidence is debated between
contesting clients, thus the clients' exercise of their ius abutendi
(disposal rights), including nolle prosequi (withdrawal of a lawsuit), is
restricted if it is approved by the court in its ruling.
B. Situational Thinking with Specific Orientation
Another reason why facts and liability are on the axis of the
administration of justice is the judicial tradition of situational thinking.
As for the nature of the relationship network, the meaning of most
phenomena is special, and it must be defined under a specific
background along with its details, which desperately calls for
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situational thinking. Evidently, situations are made up of facts, and
situational thinking prefers the role of cognition. In civil proceedings,
liability for an offense and the burden of economic losses are decided on
the principle of equity and emphasize a mutual understanding between
the parties; these are more than the judicial techniques out of
experience-they have legal basis in the provisions of the laws
concerned. For example, Articles 109, 114, 132, and 133 of the General
Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China reflect
situational ethics, or a way of thinking that emphasizes the plot and
special conditions and analyzes the specific circumstances. Although
concern about the meaning of life is also considered, the basic value
orientation is toward utilitarianism. If there were no utilitarianism in
the decision to accept or reject a court determination, situational
thinking could only induce an endless game of language or induce
getting lost in the process of differentiated specialization.
On various occasions, judges will make a decision in consideration of
changed circumstances, compare public interests, or present one or
more settlement solutions with room for reciprocal negotiations and
compromise. To Chinese judges, the rights of individuals cannot totally
be independent from the calculation of pleasure and pain formulated by
Han Fei or Jeremy Bentham, and so they cannot act on a definitive
normative basis. On the contrary, utilitarianism relativizes individuals'
rights by measuring gain and loss to society; similarly, it relativizes the
legal provisions in specific situations. When the normative rules of law
are relativized, only improvement in the cognition of facts can make up
for the defect in the basis for the judging of the case. Facts relativize the
norms while relativized norms have to further depend on facts for their
legitimacy. This is the paradox of the relationship between facts and
norms.
C. The Conflicting Pattern between the Inquisitorial System and
Tendentious Public Opinion
A trial centered on facts often brings out the viewpoints of
procurators and jurors and excludes the viewpoints of lawyers and
judges (i.e. the legal reasoning of lawyers and judges conducted from
their respective perspectives). In such a trial, justice is based on
commonsense judgments, which the people can make according to the
facts. The facts contribute to the mediumization and
de-professionalization of trial subjects, and in turn are easily influenced
by comments outside of the court or tendentious public opinion. As
de-professionalization of judges becomes more popular, the system
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through which people assess trials will be easily accepted by the public,
but it is of no significance in fact.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the modernization
of the Chinese judiciary, especially the regularization and
professionalization of the carriages of justice, has taken the narrow path
of valuing efficiency and techniques for facts verification, along with the
continuous reinforcement of the inquisitorial system. It is no wonder
that, in China, when it comes to the modernization of law and
adjudication, the concept of professional scientism, centered on the
cognition of facts, introduces and contributes to the current movement
towards the strengthening of an inquisitorial element. The mutual
facilitating relationship between modernization and professionalization
exemplifies the vicious cycle of today's judicial reform in China. As we
reflect upon the super-adversarial tendency and the
mediation-as-the-priority principle, the focus of trial procedure reform is
easily on the "decision" element, leaning to the coercion element of
super-inquisitorial system and ignoring the significance of legal
procedure and legal reasoning in the protection of individual rights. As
a result, judicial discretion expands. Without rational and institutional
constraints, the discretion tends to be abused. In this sense, arbitrary
discretion is the catalyst of judicial corruption.
V. COMBINING RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE TRIAL PROCEDURE: THE CASE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Although judicial uncertainty, as a result of judgment discrepancies,
is noticeable, the responsibility system can replace procedural
requirements and legal interpretation skills to a certain degree, and the
system can prevent miscarriages of justice.24 Because a conception of
procedural justice and an institutional arrangement to restrain judicial
discretion are lacking, a strict responsibility system becomes the most
important tool to cure the arbitrariness of power. The strict
responsibility system has been a tradition in Chinese law, in which the
detailed and precise responsibility system of incorrectly decided cases
and the punishment of adjudicators has remained. 25
24. ZHANG WENXIAN (*ZA), FA ZHEXUE FANCHOU YANJIu (XIUDING BAN)
(1*90iff 50T5M)) [THE STUDY OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
(REVISED)] (2001) (China).
25. Since 1995 when independent adjudication was strengthened, the Chinese courts
have reestablished the responsibility system of incorrectly decided cases. For criticisms,
see Wang Chengguang (=l31'), Falu Yunxing Zhong de Bu Queding Xing yu "Cuo'an
Zhuijiu Zhi" de Wuqu (,fiff - "/ [Uncertainties in the
Operation of the Law and the Trap of the Responsibility System of Incorrectly Decided
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It is noteworthy that court reform after 1998 closely combines the
responsibility system and the case management system, so-called
"traceability management." This reform transformed the notion of
procedural justice into a technical "procedural control" of all stages of a
trial, turning procedural and reasoning rules into detailed trial quality
indexes 26 in which efficiency and equity are two fundamental standards.
This procedural control is designed to separate a trial process into
different stages and provide for objective trial time limits, specific
requirements of case handling, evidence rules, courthouse techniques,
standard forms of litigation files, and judgment enforcement, followed
by consistent observation, registration, supervision, and evaluation. 27 As
traceability management connects responsibility and accountability, it
is possible that the problems of traditional contractual responsibility,
such as consequence-oriented and black-box operation, could be
overcome. Also, the procedures of negotiation, communication, trial, and
judgment execution could become transparent. In my personal view, we
might as well view the case management system as a practical
institution of Schriftlichkeitsprinzip, an interesting comparison with the
mode of the adversary trial. Here, the state power supervision takes the
form of tracing the trial activities in accordance with efficiency criterion,
in accordance with recording, counting, and analyzing the details of the
legal process, and in accordance with evaluating them in time limit and
quality requirements. This adds up to a competition mechanism based
Cases], FA XUE (1*) [LEGAL SCI. MONTHLY], no. 3, 1997, (China); Zhou Yongkun ("*4),
Cuo'an Zhuijiu Zhi yu Fazhi Guojia Jianshe-Yige Fa Shehui Xue de Sikao
- - [The Responsibility System of
Incorrectly Decided Cases and Rule of Law-A Legal Sociology Perspective], FA XUE (I*)
[LEGAL SCI. MONTHLY], no. 9, 1997, (China).
26. For details, see Zuigao Fayuan Guanyu Kaizhan "Shenpan Zhiliang Nian"
Huodong de Tongzhi (R W ff JK= "*JR _"5 f "so) [Supreme People's Court's
Notice Regarding the "Adjudication Quality Year"] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct.,
Mar. 10, 1999, effective Mar. 10, 1999),
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1200/21752/21754/
21764/21778/2006/3/wu4652829836002792-0.htm (China). For quality indexes of civil
trial, see Quanguo Minshi Anjian Shenpan Zhiliang Gongzuo Zuotan Hui Jiyao
(: #EI*r ir~ ) [Summary of the Forum on National Civil Cases
Adjudication Quality] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Nov. 29, 1999, effective Nov.
29, 1999), http://www.law-lib.comlaw/lawview.asp?id=17091 (China).
27. For the development of the case management system, its practical effects, and
detailed implementation rules, see Shanghai Interm. People's Ct., Strengthen the Case
Management, Explore New Trial Mechanism, in SUMMARIES OF COURTS SERIES OF
REFORMS 9-11 (1999) (China); Shanghai Interm. People's Ct., Basic Practices of Case
Management, in 1 NEWS & STUDY OF JUD. TRIAL 82 (2001) (China). For other local
experiments and national reform objectives, see FAYUAN LI'AN GONGZUO JI GAIGE TANsuO
(s If.-&-1 ) [THE WORK OF CASE FILING AND REFORM EXPLORATIONS] 261-65
(Ji Min (Pt) ed. 2000) (China).
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on the time sequence. This case process management, undoubtedly
buttressing the judicial power, represents progress in rationalization of
the trial system, which deserves credit.
However, it should be noted that the case management system and
other procedural constructs are administrative measures that utilize
bureaucratic techniques of control. Autonomous discussions and
rational discourses of legal reasoning are excluded.28 Moreover, it is of
no help to the evolution of the "outward accountability" mechanism
during social transformation. The present procedural control focuses on
strict compliance with the statutory trial time limits. 29 This could be a
solution to the time pressure problem in the hypothetical setting
discussed by John Rawls. However, the danger is that constructive
discussions within the adjudication will be repressed, leading to a slim
chance of reaching a consensus of judicial choice and determination.
Only by changing the institutional focus from "inward responsibility," or
"internal supervision," to "outward responsibility," or "external
supervision," can we possibly fulfill the requirements of procedural
justice through the abovementioned "procedural control."
28. The traditional communications in the courthouse in China normally contain
discussions of rituals and social relations, educational dialogues and public opinions. This
discourse space is distinctively different from modern legal reasoning and adversarial
argumentation. For detailed analysis, see Ji Weidong (921f), Falu Jieshi de Zhendi-
Tansuo Shiyong Faxue de Disan Daolu ( M i- - - JE [The
Essence of Legal Interpretation: Exploring the Third Way of Pragmatic Jurisprudence],
ZHONGWAI FAXUE (4 ) [CHINESE & FOREIGN L.1, no. 6, 1998, (China); Ji Weidong
(*-13), Zhongguo Sifa de Siwei Fangshi Jiqi Wenhua Tezheng
(' [The Mode of Thinking and Cultural Features of the
Adjudication in China], FALU FANGFA YU FALU SIWEI ( [LEGAL
METHODS & LEGAL THOUGHTS], no. 00, 2005 (China); Ji Weidong ( i13), Falu Tixi de
Duoyuan yu Zhenghe-Yu De Wo Jin Jiaoshou Shangque Fangfa Lun Wenti
( [The Pluralism and
Integration of the Legal System-A Discussion with Prof. Dworkin on Legal
Interpretation], QINGHUA FAXUE (X41,5*-) [TSINGHUA L. REV.], no. 1, 2002 (China).
29. The People's Supreme Court is obsessed with the statutory time limit to promote
trial efficiency. For the most striking example, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yange
Zhixing Anjian Shenli Qixian Zhidu de Ruogan Guiding
( , == $ ] 1 i) [Supreme People's Court Rules on
Strict Observance of Trial Time-limit] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Sept. 22,
2000, effective Sept. 28, 2000) Fa No. 29, available at
http:/Ibaike.baidu.com/view/438714.htm (China). On the standards by which adjudication
efficiency is evaluated, see Xiong Xuanguo (PAR), Zhongguo Fayuan de Xiaolu Gaige
(*XO eO4/-- [The Reform of Efficiency in Chinese Courts], ZHONGGUO FALU
(9Pffil-M) [CHINA LAW], no. 4, 2001 (China).
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VI. COMPUTER SENTENCING: ANOTHER ENDEAVOR TO EXCLUDE JUDGES'
DISCRETION
In 2003, Zichuan District Court of Shangdong Province started
designing an adjudication software. In 2006, less than three years later,
the Shangdong Higher Court endorsed and popularized the Zichuan
software at all levels of courts in Shangdong Province. By 2004, the
Zichuan experiment was a national controversy, and even an
international headline.30
The international legal community and press are taken aback at
this bold attempt and deeply concerned at the possibility that computer
trials would decide verdicts for human beings. Although software is
insulated from possible corruption, people are greatly disturbed by its
heartlessness and the inability of software to consider the specific
circumstances of a case. To some critics, this automatic and speedy
operation system of criminal sentencing is nothing but a horrible
ongoing meat grinder.
30. On May 23, 2004, the Beijing News covered a report titled "Input Criminal Facts,
Computer Makes the Sentence," introducing the Zichuan District Court experiment. This
news report soon became a national topic. For a general report, see Zhang Wenyu (3K I-)
& Liu Chunlei ( lJm), Diannao Liangxing Zhengyi Zhong Qianxing (1IYM.O'?I
Ox/ -.fr-- [Computer Sentencing in Controversy], FAZHI RIBAo (A$'i F M1) [LEGAL DAILY],
Sept. 13, 2004, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-09-13/07353650175s.shtml
(China). The controversy of computer sentencing made headlines again in 2006, when
Legal Daily reported the continuing experiment of the Zichuan District Court. Ran
Duowen (AgZ), Diannao Liangxing Nengfou Bimian Tong'an Butong Xing: Zichuan
Fayuan Tansuo Xingshi Shenpan Liangxing Biaozhun Hua (
fJ1//X&-.JX'Jff)7]1M]ff0 [Can Computer Sentencing Avoid Different Verdicts on
Same Criminal Cases: The Standardization of Criminal Sentencing Experimented in
Zichuan District Court], FAZHI RIBAO ()AJ E M) [LEGAL DAILY], Aug. 2, 2006, available at
http://news.sohu.com/20060802/n244574341.shtml (China). For other news reports and
discussions, see generally Song Wei (*i$) & Guo Xinlei (MA), Diannao Liangxing
Tiaozhan Ziyou Cailiang Quan ( [Computer Sentencing Challenge
Judicial Discretion], MINZHU YU FAZHI SHIBAO (R#t4A$I1i1 ]) [DEMOCRACY & LEGAL
Sys. TIMES], Sept. 9, 2006, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-09-
09/170210966021.shtml (China); Wang Lei (=F), Shandong Zai Zhengyi Sheng Zhong
Tuiguang Diannao Liangxing Xingqi Youwang Jingque Dao Tian
(----- iA-gL iJ' ] - .) [Shangdong Promotes Computer
Sentencing in Controversy, Sentence Could Be Accurate to the Day], NANFANG DUSHI BAO
(MJM$ ) [S. METROPOLIS DAILY], Sept. 12, 2006, available at
http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2006-09-12/135610000155s.shtml (China). For international
coverage, see generally Lester Haines, Chinese Court Deploys Sentencing Software:
'Computer Says 10 Years, Comrade,' THE REGISTER (Sept. 13, 2006),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/09/13/sentencing-software/; Sonja Thompson, Order in
the Database! The Software Says, "Go to Jail!" TECHREPUBLIC (Sept. 13, 2006),
http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/tech-news/order-in-the-database-the-software-says-go-
to-jaff186.
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If we look back to traditional Chinese legal culture, it is clear that
the fundamental feature of the ancient Chinese legal system was the
absolute sentencing principle, which minimized an adjudicator's
discretion through mechanical and detailed rules. This explains why
computer sentencing easily gained popularity in China, where the
conventional mentality still plays an important role. In addition, other
factors are worthy of discussion, including poor quality of judicial
performance, prevalent discretion abuses, repeated miscarriages of
justice, and conflicting decisions within one case.3 1 All of these negative
issues greatly shake the Chinese people's confidence in judges. Turning
to computer software is therefore understandable; once-lost objectivity,
neutrality, and certainty could be expected again. So, judges and
disputants join together to welcome the scientific light of software in the
hope that the black box that allows discretion and informal maneuvers
can be illuminated and this dehumanized attempt can seem somewhat
excusable or even acceptable.
The Zichuan District Court even formulated an Implementation
Rules of Sentencing Standardization of 100 Commonly Used Crimes, in
which it is possible to find the multiplier effect between a lifeless,
changeless, and traditional thinking pattern and that detailed rules to
automatically determine an exact punishment. This is indicative of a
judicial mirror image principle, which requires exactly the same
penalties for similar cases and stringent correspondences between
judgment and law. 32
A deep analysis reveals that a more important hidden factor, beyond
the utopian pursuit of mirror-image exactness in judgment, is the
changed understanding of the adjudication process by way of the
automatic software coding. That is, the court is trying to employ
professional legal language to replace everyday common language,
eliminating the adverse influence of emotional elements and ambiguous
words, and realizing the objective of "accurate justice." As the late
Professor Gong Ruixiang, an administrative law expert, insightfully
observed in 1983, "applying computer techniques to reprocess of
information and logic of the legal rules expressed in natural daily
31. Jiang Zuoping (44*IT) & Hou Dawei ( Chengdu Zhongji Fayuan Jing
Chuxian Sifa Shi Hanjian de "Yinyang Panjue"
(- [The Most Absurd Yin-Yang Judgment in the
History of the Chengdu Intermediate Peoples' Court], XIN HUA SHE (0-"4L) [XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY] (Sept. 14, 2006), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2006-
09/14/content_5092422.htm (China).
32. Gong Ruixiang (A#Jh) & Li Keqiang (JiAJj), Falu Gongzuo de Jisuanji Hua
(a*gi #ftffLK, [The Computerization of Legal Works], FAXUE ZAZHI (M*,It) [LAW
SCIENCE MAGAZINE], no. 3, 1983, at 16-20, available at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/
4f3645e8b8f67clcfad6bSdb.html (China).
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language, will gradually produce a new brand of legal language. This
will enhance the exactness of legal rules, making them more
standardized and generalized."
In fact, the use of computer software did achieve the objective of
standardizing legal language to a degree as the Shandong Higher Court
extended the computer sentencing in the province. Because of the
relatively poor quality of judges in the rural and mountain areas, abuse
of discretion has been a thorny problem as the president of the Zichuan
District Court pointed out. Applying sentencing software under these
circumstances "basically is a way of controlling discretion abuse through
institution"33 and helps to establish coherent professional criteria by
which judges' performances can be evaluated. In this sense, the Zichuan
efforts are worthy of praise.
Nevertheless, I have to warn that in the current situation, we
should be very cautious to design and employ any form of legal software,
let alone computer sentencing. In addition, it is unnecessary to entirely
eliminate a judge's discretional evaluation and balancing of evidence.3 4
After all, computers can never fully supersede human beings. Any legal
software inherently implies a pure legal-positivist premise. Computers
might follow the syllogism of legal rules and deductively reach a
conclusion from an "element-effect" premise. However, as to the
meta-rule, which determines the priority of rules, computers are
useless. In other words, although computer sentencing could, to a large
degree, successfully control the subjective arbitrariness of discretion,
such sentencing also discards reflective elements of law like natural
justice, human rights protections, the sense of shame, and putting
prevention first. Besides, it is also an impossible mission for a computer
to consider and balance conflicting interests according to policy
orientations. The essence of justice demands reflective and integral
considerations and balancing. In today's society of many complexities,
dynamics, and value pluralism, it is even more imperative to strengthen
the reflective elements of the law. 35
Without considering the reflective elements of the law, the
exchanges and communications in and outside the courthouse will be
reduced to inhumane machine automation. As a result, it would be
difficult to develop legal hermeneutics, legal reasoning techniques,
professional training, or the ethical personality of the adjudicator.
Judicial trials will unfortunately be degraded to a simple intellectual
game of indexing and inference. If software has already set the only
correct answer, it is then almost meaningless to have court discourses
33. Wang Lei, supra note 30.
34. TAKESHI KOJIMA & SErvICHI MORI, LITIGATION AND DEMOCRACY 43 (1976) (China).
35. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (15th ed. 1952).
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and communications seeking better solutions. Grounds of decision (ratio
decidendi) become insignificant trivia. Even the appeal system would be
gradually marginalized. If this primitive sentencing software is used in
trials as a supplementary tool in limited situations to alleviate rules
and retrieval burdens and to avoid possible omissions, it may be beyond
reproach. But if judges are required to base their decisions on
sentencing software, serious troubles are inevitable.
VII. MEDIA TRIAL AS A NEW ATTEMPT TO SUPERVISE JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
In a modern rule of law country, guaranteeing a coherent system of
laws and fair trial requires endorsement of judicial independence, not
only from government power, but also from capricious public opinions.
The judiciary derives its trustworthiness and authority from
independence. In traditional China, however, the legal system was a
diverse structure with three pillars of Qing (human feelings), Li
(natural justice), and Fa (statutory rules). Public opinions in China, as a
vehicle and an evaluation yardstick of Qing and Li, have had a long and
strong tradition of intervening in the judicial process. Such concepts as
"judging according to Confucian principles," "sentencing death penalty
according to Li," or "masses opinion above law" were once prevalent. In
contemporary China, the media creates powerful norms of discourse,
often reinforcing itself by appealing to the so-called principle of "from
the masses and to the masses."
In the sphere of public opinion, people are freed from the constraints
of traditional social structure, the formal state system, and positive
legal rules. They take liberty in expressing themselves, but sometimes
surrender to a tactful power strategy. As Juirgen Habermas emphasizes,
because of the lack of "ideal expression conditions," information has
asymmetries, facts are obscure, and conclusions are beyond any query.
In his book Public Opinion, Walter Lippmann, a famous media analyst,
criticized that relegating complex issues to the public opinion is in many
cases an escape from criticisms by the informed, which allows the
intervention of the uninformed majority.
In the process of forming public opinion, various views, rumors,
gossip, and slander compete for loudness and acceptance, turning into
one whirlpool of public opinion after another, which draws in more and
more participants and results in a flexible unitary structure and certain
absolute power. In this sense, public opinion is law. As a result, power
abducts public opinion, and then the abstract discourse of the so-called
public will and the resonance of mixed emotions dominates politics. In
the end, public opinion may even abduct power, making it difficult to
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operate rationally and routinely and thus contributing to the tendency
of public opinion deciding cases.
The best illustrations of media trials are the Yao Jiaxin and the Li
Changkui cases in 2011. These cases demonstrate two fundamental
traits of the media trial: focus on revenge and shifting opinions. Indeed,
a proportionate punishment of the criminal is consistent with justice.
On this point, Immanuel Kant, the great philosopher, is more
determined than Marchese di Beccaria, the founder of modern criminal
law, to punish offenders. Kant maintains that murderers deserve the
death penalty, which accords with the social contract and the
self-disciplined spirit of free men. As modernization progresses,
however, the retribution theory of criminal punishment is losing its
attraction. Current criminal law jurisprudence requires legitimate
reasons for punishment and restrains of revenge motives. This requires
that the criminal justice system place more emphasis on stringent
rationality analysis. In the meantime, courts are not supposed to be
influenced by any outside force; rather, they should strictly base all
sophisticated analysis, reasoning, and decisions on facts and legal rules.
Only in this manner could the judiciary shield itself against political
intervention, making sure legal standards are uniformly understood
and applied, and eliminating the confusion of differentiated treatment
and individualized rule-making.
Unfortunately, the rationalization progress of adjudication in China
has encountered an institutional and cultural bottleneck. The lack of
judicial independence from government power and the painful fact of
judicial corruption causes people to turn to so-called public opinion
supervision. Especially for the disadvantaged, mobilizing media support
becomes a useful weapon in seeking justice against the powerful. In the
Yao Jiaxin case, for instance, the intentional slandering of the suspect
as a "second generation rich" or "second generation official," plus the
heartbroken insistence on "no capital punishment, no funeral" by the
victim's family, proved to be an effective mobilization tool. On the other
hand, sometimes the judiciary also needs public opinion to resist
powerful interventions. The Chinese government now tends to justify its
decisions according to social reactions. Public opinion is closely watched.
From time to time, the government even maneuvers popular indignation
to influence trials. It is extremely easy in China to gain the media's
support when intervention is coupled with revenge. It appears that,
because of the tacit "consensus" between the government and the
masses, adding the courts' half-hearted adherence to independence,
public opinion has become an increasingly influential factor in the
judicial decision-making, while the judicial power has become
marginalized. Under the dual pressures of government and society,
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Chinese courts have become vulnerable and inconsistent. The judicial
authority is on the verge of collapse. In fact, when things come to this
stage, public opinion also becomes volatile. The Li Changkui case
provides a perfect example in which public opinion constantly swung
back and forth between two extremes of substantial justice and
procedural justice as the trial moved on.
The real problems we face today are the coercion of adjudication by
power, leading to public opinion backlashes and public opinion being
abducted by power, resulting in a lack of judicial independence. In the
battle of social justice versus judicial justice, the judicial authority
suffers and the public opinion begins to have normative effects.
However, public opinion is easily dominated and poisoned by suspicions,
biases, deceptions, fears, and hatreds. Instead of advancing harmony,
public opinion may intensify conflicts and social uncertainties. This is
the pitfall of public opinion trials. The Yao Jiaxin case, the Li Changkui
case, and the Xu Yunhe case are just recent notorious examples of the
poverty of the Chinese adjudication, which deserves serious
consideration of its future direction.
VIII. OUT OF THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF DISCRETION CONSTRAINTS IN CHINA
Chinese adjudication faces a dilemma: on the one hand, judicial
discretion is extensive, but on the other hand, public opinion has been
adopted to control the discretion. In fact, public opinion and judicial
discretion could co-exist and complement one another, but there is no
objective and stable framework regulating both. In addition, there have
been attempts to completely negate judicial discretion, such as computer
sentencing. In other words, there is strange logic in China regarding
judicial reform. For instance, one logic values eliminating judicial
discretion through mechanical methods such as computer sentencing in
the hope of guaranteeing judgments in conformity with the law. Another
logic values resorting to the arbitrary external power of public opinion
to constrain judicial discretion, even though this only results in a new
form of discretion. Up to today, I see no constructive efforts toward
breaking out of the vicious cycle of constraining judicial discretion.
A. Active Judiciary, Judicial Democratization, and Big Mediation
A way out of the above-mentioned vicious cycle demands
reconsideration and reconstruction of the court system and the entire
legal order in China. A political reform is indispensable to this process.
It is exactly because of the far-lagged political reform that, since 2000,
and due to unequal distributions and weak human rights protection in a
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booming society, accumulated social risks have intensified and resulted
in an explosive increase of visit-and-petitions, strikes, and mass
disturbances of different types. 36 In 2008, the Chinese Communist Party
shifted its policy priorities to "maintain stability" and "guarantee
economic growth and value people's livelihood."37 Unfortunately, the
36. See generally YING XING (5), DAHE YIMIN SHANGFANG DE GUSHI
("Ji .2 ) [STORIES OF VISITS-AND-PETITIONS OF THE GREAT RIVER MIGRANTS]
(2001) (China); Yu Jianrong (f=J=), Nongmin You Zuzhi Kangzheng Jiqi Zhengzhi
Fengxian-Hunan Sheng H Xian Diaocha (
04'HE NA]) [The Organized Resistance of Peasants and the Associated Political Risks:
A Survey of H County in Hunan Province], ZHANLUE YU GUANLI (A6 0) [STRATEGY &
MGMT.], no. 3, 2003 (China); Yu Jianrong (TOi), Liyi Biaoda, Fading Zhixu yu Shehui
Xiguan-Dui Dangdai Zhongguo Nongmin Weiquan Kangzheng Xingwei Quxiang de
Shizheng Yanjiu (tM ,L 14MJqt ig -
]. [Interests Expression, Legal Order and Social
Conventions: An Empirical Study of the Tendency of the Rights Movement of Contemporary
Farmers in China], ZHONGGUO NONGcUN GUANcHA (rPV 30) [CHINA RURAL
SURVEY], no. 6, 2007, at 46-54 (China); Carl F. Minzner, Riots and Cover-ups:
Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in China, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 53, 92 (2009);
Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 103 (2006); SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN CHINA AND HONG KONG: THE EXPANSION OF
PROTEST SPACE (Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce & Gilles Guiheux eds., 2009).
37. Since the financial crisis in 2008, the Central Committee of CCP has adopted the
"three guarantees policy:" guarantee economic growth, guarantee people's livelihood, and
guarantee social stability. See generally Zhongyang Jingji Gongzuo Huiyi Zai Beijing
Zhaokai Hu Jintao Wen Jiabao Zuo Zhongyao Jianghua ( Ii -/L{- ff
4],i f J~ [Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Made Important Speeches at the
Closing Session of the Central Economic Meeting], RENMIN RIBAO (AF HE4R) [PEOPLE'S
DAILY], Dec. 11, 2008, at 1 (China); ,,k ,, (Li Yajie), Xi Jinping Zai Shanxi Diaoyan Shi
Qiangdiao Jiehe Xuexi Shijian Kexue Fazhan Guan Huodong Jiaqing He Gaijin Dang de
Jianshe ( , [Xi
Jinping Emphasized Strengthening and Improving the CCP's Construction Through the
Activity of Studying and Practicing the Scientific Development Concept When He
Conducted Research in Shanxi], RENMIN RIBAO (AR FiJN) [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Mar. 27,
2009, at 1 (China); Xu Jingyue (tz,,k), Li Yuanchao Zai Zhongyang Xuexi Shijian
Guodong Zhidao Jiancha Zu Huiyi Shang Zhichu Xuexi Shijian Huodong Yao Bao
Fazhan Bao Minsheng Bao Wending Bao Zhongyang Fangzhen Zhengce Luoshi
-- [Li Yuanchao Pointed out at the
Central Study and Practical Activities Guidance and Inspection Group Meeting That
Study and Practical Activities Should Abide by the Policy of Guaranteeing Economic
Growth, Guaranteeing People's Livelihood, Guaranteeing Social Stability, and
Guaranteeing Carrying out Central Governments' Policies], RENMIN RIBAO ( ,kRH*)
[PEOPLE'S DAILY], Nov. 6, 2008, at 2 (China); Zhao Naizheng ( Jl), Zhou Yongkang Zai
Wosheng Kaocha Gongzuo Shi Qiangdiao Ba Kexue Fazhan Guan Luoshi Dao Bao
Zengzhang Bao Minsheng Bao Wending Zhong -
] A/ J - !it f ) [Zhou Yongkang Emphasized Putting the
Scientific Development Concept into the Practices of Guaranteeing Economic Growth,
Guaranteeing People's Livelihood, and Guaranteeing Social Stability When He Inspected
Work in Jilin Province], JILIN RIBAO (=LP- H ) [JILIN DAILY], Feb. 18, 2009, at 1 (China).
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mentality of maintaining stability further delays serious discussion of
political reform. Under these circumstances, the judiciary, regarded as
"the ultimate defense of social stability," yielded to the policy guidelines
of the CCP Central Committee of Politics and Law; re-oriented judicial
reform since 1998; and began implementing new judicial policies of
"mass line of justice," "big mediation," "active judiciary," and "three key
works" (i.e. resolving social conflicts, innovating social management,
and impartial and honest law enforcement).38 The Justice Department,
at all levels, openly advanced the notion that a 'lawyer should stick to
right political standing, consider overall situations, and abide by
discipline."3 9
A sympathetic inquiry into the logic behind the above-mentioned
phenomenon reveals that the very reason that Chinese political-legal
authorities promoted so-called "big mediation" (da tiaojie) practices to
handle social uncertainties that lie in the flexibilities of law. As we
know, more uncertainties result in fewer uses of professional skills and
stronger tendencies toward a conformist mentality. In such a quickly
transforming society as China, conflicts intensify each day, new
controversies emerge endlessly, and the fine line of legal-illegal
gradually blurs. It is therefore very hard to make a definite decision
under the prescribed statutory rules. Mediation and compromise come
to adjudication's rescue. In the same vein, it is also understandable that
the "active judiciary" campaign, imbued with specific political
38. The changes of the CCP's judicial policy started in 2006. See The Supreme People's
Court Opinions of Preventing and Resolving Administrative Disputes, Developing
Administrative Disputes Settlement Mechanism (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct.) Fa
No. 27 (China). Since then, major documents representing the systemic shift of judicial
policy include Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jinyibu Fahui Susong Tiaojie Zai Goujian
Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Zhong Jiji Zuoyong de Ruogan Yijian
[Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court Opinions on Further Displaying the
Positive Roles of Litigation Mediation in the Building of a Socialist Harmonious Society]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Mar. 1, 2007, effective Mar. 1, 2007) Fa No. 9,
available at http://www.china
law.gov.cnlarticle/fgkdlxfg/sfwj/200904/20090400132176.shtml (China). For an academic
review of the judicial policy since 2007, see HE HAIBO (fnJr6), Xingzheng Susong Chesu
Kao (1987-2008) (60if/iAWW (1987-2008)) [A Survey of Withdrawing Claims in
Administrative Litigation (1987-2008)], in SHIZHI FAZHI: XUNQIU XINGZHENG PANJUE DE
HEFAXING (5lJ 2 : 4*fT ] *- * t}) [SUBSTANTIVE GOVERNANCE BY LAW: SEEK
THE LEGITIMACY OF JUDGMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION] (2009) (China).
39. Cui Qingxin (0 ), Sifa Bu: Zuohao Lushi Daili Mingan Anjian he Qunti Xing
Shijian Zhidao ( 7S -l : [The Ministry of Justice:
Provide Guidance for Lawyers Regarding Representation in Sensitive Cases and Cases
Involving Mass Disturbance], WWW.NPC.GOV.CN (C PM),tR [ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG]
(Aug. 8, 2009), http://www.npc gov.cn/npc/xinwen/fztd/yfxz/2009-
08/08/content_1512851.htm (China).
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connotations and administrative influences, was also launched to evade
formal litigation and seek extrajudicial remedies. This is far off track.
We have to ponder whether the prevailing and reckless judicial
activism, obviously eroding legislative and executive competences, could
ever achieve desirable objectives instead of opening a Pandora's box.
B. The Paradox of the Criterion of People's Satisfaction with Courts'
Performance
Recently in China, the idea that judicial performance should be
evaluated by the degree of people's satisfaction has been popular. A
hidden belief is that judges can adjust the application of law in
accordance with mainstream attitudes; therefore, judges' discretion is
necessary and justified. Obviously, this active judicial policy spurs a
flock of litigants to take advantage of the discretion and bargain, greatly
increasing communication between courts and people. During these
exchanges, Chinese courts nowadays embrace "big mediation,"
emphasizing voluntary settlement among parties.
In practice, this judicial policy has caused Chinese courts trouble.
Disputants are encouraged to race to the courthouse, but judges are left
with only an outdated mediation technique. As a matter of fact, it is
impossible for courts to satisfy everyone; at least in most cases half of
the parties (the losing party) will be discontent with the unfavorable
judgment. If a court attempts to please everyone, it is nothing short of
shackling itself. In China, this ironic paradox becomes real: courts are
at the forefront of dealing with social problems. However, in the full
glare of publicity, judicial authority keeps withering and becoming
marginalized.
To save judicial reform, we must go back to basics, that is, a system
guided by procedural fairness. It has been tested and proven, by a
number of psychological experiments done by social psychologists
including John Thiabut, Laurens Walker, Allan Lind, and Tom Tyler,
that procedural fairness is determinative of the satisfaction of
disputants and other concerned people. A losing party's acceptance of an
unfavorable judgment comes from procedural justice, not a wishful
reliance on political persuasion, repression, or public opinion.
To put it another way, when people's satisfaction or feelings become
simple-minded criteria by which judicial performance is assessed, the
administration of justice is reduced to nothing but subjective prejudices
and capricious sensations. The implied message is that the judiciary is
insignificant, and the legitimacy of judicial authority rests upon public
opinion. This is nothing less than the deconstruction of the court
system, a variant of legal nihilism.
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C. Individual Responsibility and Nobody's Responsibility
In a transformation period when social conflicts intensify and
uncertainties increase, in addition to resorting to procedure as a
solution, more emphasis should also be placed on the legal responsibility
regime. In China, however, it is also beneficial to maintain
noninstitutional individual responsibilities or a conventional contract
responsibility system. On the contrary, the Achilles' heel of the current
"big mediation" and "active judiciary" movements is that no meaningful
responsibility or accountability system can survive. Also, in the name of
democratic politics as the basis of individual responsibility, we might
find ourselves in the woeful predicament of having no one responsible
for anything. Take the "active judiciary" movement for example. Courts,
which are supposed to be the last defense of state order, are now on the
front line. The politicized judicial process roots out objective standards
in specific cases, exposing individual judges to unknown political
consequences and risks. As a result, judges tend to skirt their duties
and dodge finger pointing from society. Some local courts even
impudently call for "zero-judgment," which in essence is
"zero-responsibility." Here, we see self-negation of the judge's function:
if parties' bargaining and compromising displaces judicial decision, then
what is the use of the judge? Mediation, as well as other ADR
(Alternative Dispute Resolution) alternatives, in certain scenarios in
China, has to a large degree degenerated into a black box where corrupt
judges abuse their discretion and evade duties. State order, therefore,
may easily deteriorate into chaos or even an overall crisis.
A floating legal order is not a normal representation of the
relationship between the legal system and society. It is floating, not due
to the inevitability, but because the top-down design of existing
institutions and policies is misleading. From the traditional conception
of "three binding principles," to the contemporary legislative policy of a
'"road outline rather than detailed accuracy," we can easily trace the
origin of mass-line justice; "active judiciary" and "big mediation," jointly
increase fluidity, relativity, and complexity of the legal system.
Opportunistic manipulation of legal rules is, therefore, abetted.
Disputing parties and the general public also tend to imitate each other
in areas of compliance and other social behaviors. In this changing
normative field, how "collective opinion" or public opinion is formed is
always critical. This is the essence of judicial democracy. But in reality,
adjudication is reduced to assuaging individual claims, assembling
collective views, and coordinating public opinions. Collective
preferences, in turn, become standards and norms with coercive
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authority, determining each disputant's legal concept and lawful
remedies.
D. The Adjudicative Power Revisited From the Perspective of
Coordination
In my view, the principal cause of the "active judiciary" and "big
mediation" movements in China is rooted in the misunderstanding of
two fundamental dimensions of law. Generally, as rules of conduct, law
deals with two types of issues: sollen (the duty to the right thing) and
coordination. These two functions of law are distinctive and should be
clearly differentiated. In China, however, there is no explicit distinction;
the two are intertwined, making conceptual analysis and comparison
impossible. The coordination function of law has long been ignored,
resulting in chronic entanglement of ideology that institutional reform
failed to shake off.
In this paper, sollen concerns value judgment and moral and
legitimating elements, and also relates to justifications of compliance. It
is closely associated with the cultural tradition and ideology of a society,
in Friedrich K. Savigny's words the "national ethos." As a country that
attaches great importance to substantive ethics codes and cultural
identity, China always emphasizes core values. Thus, sollen is a
political priority and focal point of law. The rules of property ownership
and domestic relationship, for instance, always involve social
conceptions of justice and moral order. The same goes for principles of
public order and equitable responsibility. The "Crackdown" movement
in the criminal law field reflects value conflicts of crime punishment and
injustice prevention. It is subject to the legal ideology. Undoubtedly,
sollen commands everything, sometimes outweighing even the facts.
Disproportionate insistence on a single value or virtue brings out the
dark side of self-reinforcement of that value or virtue, contrarily
suppressing free and rational choices.
On the other hand, the coordination function of law refers to
ordering on a technical level. This coordination favors certainty and
efficiency, which have no direct and consequential relationship with
value judgment. Traffic rules, for instance, differ from place to place,
but they are all feasible. Neither driving on the right, as in China and
the United States, nor driving on the left, as in Japan and Britain, is in
itself good or bad. As long as the traffic rule is clear and strictly
implemented, the flow of vehicles is coordinated and traffic jams and
collisions are avoided. Of course, legal processes contain sollen
elements, but their major function is to coordinate conflicting claims,
diverse interests, and competing values equally. In this way, the most
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:1
convincing and well-argued option will become a judicial decision. The
significance of legal procedure is, therefore, to an extent, adapting a
sophisticated sollen problem to a coordination issue and resolving the
complicated value judgment on a technical and rational basis.
In the situation of definite uncertainties, it would undoubtedly be
extremely difficult to make a decision through prediction and
calculation and apply specialized skills to cope with. Given this
circumstance, people tend to be flexible and adaptable, as in the stock
market or real estate market, and are inclined to go with the tide. To
put it another way, increasing uncertainties may change the group
action pattern from technical rationality to irrational and emotional
mutual imitation, leaving society with dramatic ups and downs and
leading to social turmoil and destruction. Bearing in mind this possible
plight, the government should devote itself to changing definite
uncertainties into probabilistic uncertainties; promoting rationalization
processes; and predicting, calculating, steering, and controlling those
complex and flowing situations through professional skills. If
government encourages and participates in the collective action of
mutual imitation, then definite uncertainties will increase sharply to
the dead end of an uncontrollable predicament or crisis. Unfortunately,
the current obsession with and experiments in "active judiciary,"
"judicial democratization," and "big mediation" are repeating the same
failure; fomenting the mutual imitations and emotional incentives in
society, and converting the courts into stock markets and casinos.
E. Highlighting the Coordination Function and Strengthening the
Forces of Law
On the sollen level, moral discourse complicates judicial reasoning
and loosens the binding effects of legal rules. On the coordination level,
in contrast, law must be rigid to fulfill the purposes of the legal system.
In this regard, besides overcoming defects of the current power
structure, the key to weak legal awareness and noncompliance problems
in China is to differentiate the sollen function from the coordination
function of law, to give more importance to the coordination function,
and to make the law as effective as it should be. The law will then have
both a flexible structure and a rigid binding. In essence, in order to
unshackle the judiciary from such value judgments as morals, class
wills, and state ideology, and to ensure that judges are only subject to
law and are insulated from outside influences, we should commit
ourselves to developing the coordination function of law. When the
congressional majority legislates at its will, the courts can conduct
constitutionality review, safeguarding the certainty of constitutional
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order and the coherence of the legal system. This is the coordination
function of law. When the government abuses its power and infringes on
personal rights administrative litigation balances the correlation of
state and the individual, which is also a coordination function of law.
Under such circumstances, if rules are not abided by and the judiciary is
not independent, the inevitable coordination problems cannot be
resolved and the social order would falter without support. Sollen, then,
would fail too.
The most salient feature of so-called "judicial democratization" is
that adjudication is isolated from the coordination function and courts
directly confront sollen problems. The core of democracy is in who
decides what, and generally the majority has the final say. In this sense,
judicial democratization implies that adjudicators are not necessarily
professional judges, but that common citizens are also included, and
more importantly, the determination of individual rights is in the hands
of the majority. For this reason, judicial democratization means that
value discourses and debates will rise. Here, judges are more or less
biased in their outlook, making it hard to maintain their neutrality and
objectivity, which are critical for judges to perform their coordination
function. The crux of justice is to strictly observe the legitimate essence
of law, and law is better understood as an expression of general public
opinion. The judicial democratization is using, in contrast, a special and
partial representation of whims of public opinion to measure and adjust
general and total public will (i.e., national laws). In line with judicial
democratization, judges have to exceed the existing legal framework and
create local communal norms to satisfy disputants. The moment and
contingency of political compromises are, therefore, embedded in the
judicial process, leading to localization, individualization, and
fragmentation of the law. There we can see two conflicting public
opinions: legislative public opinion and judicial public opinion.
Adjudicators can use manipulation to defy binding legaf rules and trial
hierarchy.
F. Interaction between Sollen and Coordination
Considering the judicial function from the perspective of
coordination, we find that judicial independence is no more than a legal
yardstick by which power relations are in balance, an institutional
brake to control the abuses of the legislature and the administrative
branch, and a prominent fortress of legitimate order and social fairness.
In fact, even from the sollen aspect of judicial function, we shall still
stick to the judicial independence principle; otherwise, legal rules are
easily drowned in the sea of factual details. It is exactly their
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independent and neutral status that enables judges to stand outside
factual power relations and fulfill the sollen function in the process of
technical coordination. For judges, the right ideology is
de-ideologization; the correct value judgment is value neutrality.
Certainly, this does not mean judges can be completely freed from
ideology or disregard the fundamental social consensus to reach their
value judgment. The point is the maximum of neutrality and objectivity
of the adjudication. Partisan values are better handled in different
areas of government or in law firms. When it comes to sollen issues like
political democracy, the people's congresses are the right forum for
deliberations. Obviously, the legislature should also perform the
coordination function, especially on issues of determining taxes, tax
rates, and re-distributional budget planning. Above all, the legislature
should pay more attention to transforming sollen into positive rules in
clear terms and balancing or determining the appropriate sollen to
coordinate and regulate social relations.
It goes without saying that the socialist rule of law order that we
are pursuing is not a repressive society regulated by coercive rules; we
should pay great attention to the legitimacy of regulation. In a modern
society, the legitimacy of regulation mainly rests upon public will.
General acceptance or recognition is the legitimate basis of any legal
order. This public will, however, can neither simply be equated to
transient or localized group opinion, nor to the mass attitudes toward
specific trials. Public will, as I understand it, means the procedural
rules of the majority and institutional arrangements taking into account
both individual freedom and public affairs decision-making. Here I
would like to emphasize that rule of law should and could serve as the
basis of democracy. By providing fundamental political confidence and
avoiding the tyranny of the majority, rule of law could make democracy
a stable, sophisticated way of social life. Democracy and rule of law are
indispensable to each other.
As to the power structure in China, if the People's Congresses and
government departments could be viewed as representing the majority,
it is equally important to recognize that the judiciary represents the
minority, individuals, and the disadvantaged. The majority's interests
could be secured either through legislative procedures or in the name of
the public interest protected through administrative implementation.
However, dissenting voices of the minority, especially of a common
citizen, could hardly be reflected in this system even it is reasonable and
correct. Only in the court will every opinion be carefully heard and
maybe find a way of being incorporated into the framework of the
system. Especially in a relatively centralized government structure,
judicial independence could clearly limit the boundaries of power while
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providing institutional validity for the basis of power. Moreover, if the
judgment is made after considering special conditions and reasonable
claims of the parties involved, it may also remedy loopholes of law and
administrative measures. In this sense, it could also limit the judiciary
and correct the legislature and the administrative branch to some
extent, becoming a lever for minorities and individuals to promote social
progress and institutional change. This is the reason why the
democratic processes of legislation and judicial independence are
indispensable to each other.
IX. CONCLUSION: BUILDING A PROCEDURE'S REPUBLIC
Generally, the efficiency of state governance is based on two
institutional arrangements: democratic elections and separation of
powers. In China, actual operation of these institutions have to be
premised on the following two issues. First, if a desirable election is
preconditioned on information disclosure and sufficient communication,
deliberation, and negotiation, then the extent to which information is
disclosed promptly and the extent to which problem-solving capabilities
exist may be balanced. While the capacity of problem-solving is
underdeveloped, making all concealed problems public is bound to cause
social crisis, adding to the difficulty of a way out. At this stage, rational
communications are especially needed, which depend on full-fledged
legal procedures. Second, appropriate separation of powers rely on a
strong integration mechanism, which in return requires a centralized,
unified authority and a cultural identity. Usually, the legal community
is an effective integration mechanism suited for separation of powers.
However, without judicial independence, is it still possible for
integration through rule of law? When the courts peel off authority, the
legal system as a whole also stumbles in disgrace. Power separations
then tend to disintegrate within society. In fact, due to the weak
buttress of the legal system, political power cannot open for election
because the ruling elites cannot predict the consequences of losing
power. The ruling elite fear their political opponents' arbitrary purge
and worry about insecurity of minority's rights.
Therefore, the critical nexus of institutional design of good
governance is an independent judiciary following the principle of
procedural fairness. In China, we need to establish the courts' authority
through judicial reforms, laying the institutional foundation of rule of
law; then, the supervising and checking of the legality of the
government power may be considered. Unless social trust is cemented
by rule of law, it is doubtful that we can peacefully promote the
democratization process of returning the ruling power to the public
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through elections. Political reforms, as a result, also require a soft
landing. More importantly, there is a need for an independent judiciary
to function as a neutral arbiter of conflicting interest groups and a
third-party enforcer of contracts, enhancing the predictability of market
transactions and safeguarding fair competition.
In China, there are two additional aspects worthy of attention.
First, although the independent judiciary not only limits power, but also
justifies the legitimacy of power, it still may bring about unpleasant
conflicts if the judiciary functions collide with the inherent logic of the
political power structure. The current political power structure has not
undergone substantive changes in China. Institutional conflicts are
almost inevitable as the boundary of judicial independence is
expanding. Therefore, some people maintain that no real judicial reform
would ever succeed if there were no overhaul of the political power
structure. I beg to differ on this point. Compared with the structural
shifts of political power, judicial reform is relatively less difficult and
more practical. If judicial reform is doomed to fail, then how could a
comprehensive political reform succeed? It is admitted that the judicial
reform is subject to the overall power arrangements; nevertheless, it is
still probable that we will resort to judicial reform, as a breakthrough or
reference, gradually transforming political power structures by
centering the discussion on fundamental requirements of rule of law.
This roadmap, of course, has preconditions; the ruler must have
adequate practical rationality, and society must reach consensus on the
rule of law.
Second, judicial independence also has preconditions, the most
fundamental of which is that judges are supposed to be a group of elites
with integrity, wisdom, and responsibility. Chinese judges are,
unfortunately, too many in quantity and too poor in quality. It is a
formidable challenge, if not impossible, for any social group of more
than 200,000 to maintain its high quality. In addition, judges in China
have existed for a very short period of time and the notion of procedural
fairness is alien to many judges. In this context, judicial credibility and
authority still have a long way to go. Popular support of judicial
independence is shaky. On the bright side, however, if we recognize the
critical importance of judicial independence to the rule of law and the
political structure changes, we can start with the independence
principle and readapt the institutional design, necessitating relevant
conditions and renewing judicial personnel. When consensus is reached
that courts are entitled to final decisions in independent trials, and
judicial or constitutional review of all power acts is reasonable, then it
will be obvious who is qualified to be a judge and how to guarantee
judges' autonomous decision-making.
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In China, an orderly pursuance of top-down political reform guided
by market-economy forces is nothing short of step-by-step progression
and incremental transformation of the mode of governance, while
maintaining the stability of the existing power structure. Promoting
rule of law is now the top priority. It does not matter whether or not the
existing Chinese legal system is perfect; any government, social
organization, or individual has to acknowledge that this legal system
represents the general will and should be abided by. Starting from that
point, the greatest common ground could be found. Naturally, the courts
rule in strict accordance with the law. In essence, the judicial
independence principle is a covenant made by the government that
commits itself to following the law, in the same* way as companies and
citizens do, and to guaranteeing equality before the law through its
declaration of noninterference with the judiciary. The denial of judicial
independence bespeaks the unwillingness of the government to leave
the courts to adjudicate. To the rule-maker, it is nothing but a flagrant
declaration to the world that "I myself will not be bound by the law."
There can be no greater or more imprudent stupidity.
China's experiences in the past three decades of reform and opening
up resemble, to some extent, the post-war development in Japan. First
of all, both countries were fortunate to have a stable social order with
political continuity and a centralized power structure. Economic
successes were so dazzling that discontents were eclipsed or concealed.
Economic development is, however, no panacea at all. The legitimacy
issue emerged. According to the people's sovereignty theory, the only
origin of legitimacy of state power is the people. But sometimes, the
sources of legitimacy are unclear, corresponding institutions are not
strong, and it is necessary to have another guarantee. For instance,
even when the general public is satisfied with the direction of
development and trusts the leadership as a whole, there will still be
controversies in the exercise of power at a specific level or on a
particular issue. How to resolve these controversies? The people need an
opportunity of remedy. They deserve an explanation and they want to
see that their rights are protected in this system. This is the reason for
an independent judiciary. Even with slight discontent, people still will
be happy to have a neutral third-party arbiter for a foreseeable result.
Keeping this dispute resolution system working means everyone is safe.
In short, judicial independence, on which consensus is easier to reach, is
the breakthrough of future reform in China.
From the perspective of procedural fairness, two elements of
democracy are essential. First is the principle of taxation through
statutory rules, that is, neither taxes nor tax rates should ever be
decided by the executive. All tax rules should be stipulated in statutes
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through the democratic process of the People's Congress. Second is the
principle of budget transparency. Budget review is a key part of the
democratic process and a lever to realizing distributive justice. It must
not be a mere formality. In China today, with annual fiscal revenue of
more than RMB 10,000 billion and social security becoming a major
concern at all levels, democracy should start from budget transparency.
In practice, we hope to adjust diverse interests and redistribute national
welfare by way of parliamentary budgeting.
I believe only the recipe of "parliamentary budgeting" can
seamlessly glue forthcoming deep water political reforms with economic
reforms and ensure a soft landing of social transformation. Only
through parliamentary 'budgeting can we strike a balance among the
actual power conflicts, stick to the judicial independence principle to
realize formal equality, effectively strengthen government credibility,
and steer China peacefully on the ocean of increasing global
uncertainties. In this sense, the judicial reform in China should be
conceived within a bigger picture. Without breaking the failing and
ossified framework, and adapting the grand top-down design of state
governance to these new circumstances, it will be a very difficult, if not
completely impossible, to push forward judicial reform and social
transformation, or to develop stable and efficient institutions of
democratic politics.
